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Lessons from the United Stales
Kent McNeil *
Twenty years have passed since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms as one of the additions to the Constitution contained in
the Constitution Act, 1982.' Since then, an on-going debate has ensued over the
application of the Charter to Aboriginal governments. Discussions of this issue
usually centre on two questions, one legal and the other normative: first, does
the Charter apply to Aboriginal governments as a matter of Canadian
constitutional law, and second, should the Charter apply to Aboriginal
governments?
These questions obviously beg a preliminary question of what is meant
by "Aboriginal governments." In an earlier article,' I identified three
categories of Aboriginal governments that need to be considered in this
context: (1) traditional Aboriginal governments, defined as "Indian, Inuit,
and Mdtis governments which do not have a statutory or explicit
constitutional base, but which exist or could be constituted by Aboriginal
peoples as expressions of their inherent right of self-government ;,,3 (2)
Indian Act' band council governments ; and (3) other forms of Aboriginal
government, arising out of land claims agreements or statutory provisions.'
To these should now be added the Nunavut Government, a territorial
government created by federal statute,6 like those of the Yukon and the
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Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.) 1982, c. 11.
K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Governments and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"
(1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 61, republished in K. McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on
Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon : University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 2001) 215 [hereinafter Emerging Justice?].
4 Ibid. at 63-64 in Emerging Justice? at 217.
5 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
The other forms of Aboriginal government discussed in the article are Cree local
government under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and Sechelt Indian
government under the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, S.C. 1986, c. 27. A more
recent example can be found in the Nisga'a Final Agreement, initialed August 4, 1998.
Chapter 2, para. 9, of this Agreement provides : "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms applies to Nisga'a Government in respect of all matters within its authority,
bearing in mind the free and democratic nature of Nisga'a Government as set out in this
6 Agreement."Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28, generally in force 1 April 1999.
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Northwest Territories, that is under the de facto control of the Inuit who
comprise about 80 per cent of the population of the territory.7
This article is limited to the application of the Charter to traditional
Aboriginal governments, as defined above, which will be referred to
hereinafter simply as Aboriginal governments. In the main, the article leaves
aside the unresolved question of whether the Charter currently applies to
these governments as a matter of Canadian constitutional law,8 seeking
instead to shed some light on the normative issue of whether the Charter
should apply. It is not my intention, however, to attempt to resolve this
controversial political issue, or even to survey and assess the various
arguments others have made for and against the application of the Charter in
this context.9 Rather, my modest goal is to contribute what I can to this
debate by looking south of the border to the American experience with the
Note that s.32(1)(a) of the Charter provides that it applies "to the Parliament and
government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament
including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories".
Given that the Constitution is a "living tree" that has to be interpreted so as to apply in
contemporary contexts (Edwards v. Canada (A.G.) [1930] A.C. 124 at 136 (P.C.)), the
courts would probably hold the Nunavut Government to be subject to the Charter, as are
the governments of the Yukon and Northwest Territories.
This issue is discussed in Emerging Justice?, supra note 2, where it is concluded that the
Charter does not apply to these governments. For other perspectives, see P. W. Hogg and
M.E. Turpel, "Implementing Aboriginal Self-Government: Constitutional and
Jurisdictional Issues" in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Aboriginal Self-
Government: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1995) 375 at 415-20; J. Koshan, "Aboriginal Women, Justice and the Charter: Bridging
the Divide?" (1998) 32 U.B.C.L. Rev. 23; P. Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the
Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) at 194-210; Report
of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services, 1996), vol. 2 : Restructuring the Relationship [hereinafter RCAP Vol. 2] at 226-
34; K. Wilkins, "... But We Need the Eggs : The Royal Commission, the Charter of Rights
and the Inherent Right of Aboriginal Self-Government" (1999) 49 U. of T. LJ. 53.
E.g. see M. Boldt & J.A. Long, "Tribal Philosophies and the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms" in M. Boldt & J.A. Long, eds., The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples
and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1985) 165; J. Borrows,
"Contemporary Traditional Equality : The Effect of the Charter on First Nation Politics"
(1994) 43 U.N.B.L.J. 19; T. Isaac & M.S. Maloughney, "Dually Disadvantaged and
Historically Forgotten? : Aboriginal Women and the Inherent Right of Self-Government"
(1992) 21 Man. L. Rev. 453; J. Anthony Long and K. B. Chiste, "Indian Governments and
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1994) 18 Am. Indian Culture & Rsch. J.
91; S.D. Mclvor, "Self-Government and Aboriginal Women" in M.A. Jackson & N.K.
Banks, eds., Ten Years Later: The Charter and Equality for Women (Vancouver : Simon
Fraser University, 1996) 77; P. Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward: Dreaming First
Nations' Independence (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999) at 135-57; T. Nahanee,
"Dancing with a Gorilla: Aboriginal Women, Justice and the Charter" in Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Aboriginal Peoples and the Justice System (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1993) 359; Native Women's Association of Canada,
Statement on the "Canada Package" (Ottawa: Native Women's Association of Canada,
1992); B. Schwartz, First Principles, Second Thoughts : Aboriginal Peoples,
Constitutional Reform and Canadian Statecraft (Montreal: Institute for Research on
Public Policy, 1986) at 365-97; M.E. Turpel/Aki-Kwe, "Aboriginal Peoples and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms : Contradictions and Challenges" (1989) 10
Can. Woman Studies 49; M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter:
Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences" (1989-90) 6 C.H.R.Y.B. 3; RCAP Vol. 2,
supra note 8 at 226-34; Wilkins, supra note 8; D. Russell, A People's Dream: Aboriginal
Self-Government in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000) at
103-30.
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application of civil rights guarantees to tribal governments, and see whether
there is anything we in Canada can learn from that experience.' °
Tribal Governments and Civil Rights in the United States
Indian Sovereignty and the American Constitution
Ever since the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia" and Worcester v. Georgia12 in the early 1830s, Indian tribes in the
United States have been regarded in American law as quasi-independent
nations. While their original sovereignty was diminished by European
colonization and their inclusion within the boundaries of the United States,
they retained authority over their own territories and internal affairs. This
authority does not depend on any delegation of jurisdiction from the United
States; instead, it is derived from the tribes' "inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished. 13 This residual sovereignty
is nonetheless subject to the plenary power of Congress over the Indian
tribes, which can be used to diminish their authority. 4 But to the extent that
tribal sovereignty is not inconsistent with the tribes' incorporation into the
United States and has not been limited by Congress, tribal governments can
continue to exercise the inherent sovereignty of the Indian nations. 5
Given that Indian sovereignty pre-dates the formation of the United
States and entails inherent rather than delegated authority, tribal
governments are outside the scope of the American Constitution. As a
consequence, tribal governments are not subject to the civil rights guarantees
1o With the exception of Schwartz, supra note 9, Canadian commentators generally have not
sought guidance from the American experience in this context. While Russell, supra note
9, does draw very useful insights from American law, he does not go into the application
of civil rights guarantees to tribal governments.1 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
12 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) at 322-23. See also United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) esp. at 381-82; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544
(1975) at 557.
Congressional power over the Indian tribes comes from the U.S. Constitution, especially
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Although this power is said to
be "plenary", it is subject to constitutional limits and the federal trust responsibility owed
to the Indian tribes: see F.S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 ed.
(Charlottesville : Michie Bobbs-Merrill, 1982) at 207-28 [hereinafter Cohen's Handbook];
V. Deloria, Jr., and C.M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1983) at 40-45 [hereinafter American Indians, American Justice]; C.F.
Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern
Constitutional Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) at 78-86. For
critical commentary on the plenary power, see N.J. Newton, "Federal Power over Indians :
Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations" (1984) 132 U. Penn. L. Rev. 195; L. M. Hauptman,
"Congress, Plenary Power, and the American Indian, 1870 to 1992" in Oren Lyons et al.,
Exiled in the Land of the Free : Democracy, Indian Nations, and the U.S. Constitution
(Santa Fe: Clear Light Publishers, 1992) 317; D.E. Wilkins & K.T. Lomawaima, Uneven
Ground:American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2001) at 98-116.
'5 United States v. Wheeler, supra note 13 at 323. See Cohen's Handbook, supra note 14 at
229-57; W.C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell, 2nd ed. (St. Paul: West
Publishing, 1988) at 69-79.
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contained in the Bill of Rights Amendments to the Constitution. In Talton v.
Mayes,'6 this issue arose in the context of the grand jury requirement in the
Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court decided that this requirement does
not apply to a tribal court exercising criminal jurisdiction under the laws of
the Cherokee Nation. In the words of the Supreme Court,
... the existence of the right in Congress to regulate the manner in
which the local powers of the Cherokee nation shall be exercised
does not render such local powers Federal powers arising from and
created by the Constitution of the United States. It follows that as the
powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee nation
existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the
Fifth Amendment.1
7
The Talton decision had far-reaching effect, for it "meant that such
constitutional guarantees as free speech, the free exercise of religion, the
right to an attorney in a criminal case, and similar benefits were not
available to American Indians [in their relations with their own tribal
governments] unless specifically provided for in a tribal code or
constitution."' 8 Nor did a 1924 federal statute 19 conferring citizenship on all
Indians born in the United States extend these constitutional protections to
them in relation to their own governments. 20 In Native American Church v.
Navajo Tribal Council,2' a Tribal Ordinance prohibiting importation and use
of peyote on the Navajo Reservation was challenged as a violation, inter
alia, of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion, since
members of the plaintiff church used it in their religious ceremonies. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied relief, stating:
No provision in the Constitution makes the First Amendment
applicable to Indian nations nor is there any law of Congress doing
so. It follows that neither, under the Constitution or the laws of
Congress, do the Federal courts have jurisdiction of tribal laws or
regulations, even though they may have an impact to some extent on
.... 22
forms of religious worship.
16 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
7 Ibid., 384. For a critical assessment of this decision, see Schwartz, supra note 9 at 366-70.
For affirmation of the ruling in Talton v. Mayes that the U.S. Bill of Rights does not apply
to the Indian tribes, see Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) at 693; Nevada v. Hicks, 121
S.Ct. 2304 (2001) at 2323 (Souter J.).
American Indians, American Justice, supra note 14 at 127.
'9 43 Stat. 253, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1995).
20 J. Chaudhuri, "American Indian Policy: An Overview" in V. Deloria, Jr., ed., American
Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century (Norman : University of Oklahoma Press, 1985) 15
at 30. See also Note, "The Constitutional Rights of the American Tribal Indian" (1965) 51
Virginia L. Rev. 121 at 135 [hereinafter "Constitutional Rights"] where it is argued that
the extension of American citizenship to Indians generally should have subjected tribal
21 governments to constitutional guarantees.
272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
22 Ibid. at 135. See also Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962). In Toledo v. Pueblo
de Jemez, 119 F.Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954), an attempt to challenge a tribal council's
alleged denials of religious freedom as violations of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1958), also failed in federal court. For discussion, see "Constitutional Rights", supra note
20 at 131-32.
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This decision was consistent with the same Court's earlier decision in
Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 3 where the Court relied on Talton to reject
a due process challenge to tribal membership determinations. Similarly, in
Glover v. United States' a Federal District Court denied a writ of habeas
corpus to a petitioner who alleged that he had been denied legal counsel and
a right to appeal by a tribal court because, in the Court's words, "the
provisions of the Federal constitution guaranteeing due process and the right
to counsel do not apply in prosecutions in tribal courts."25
Tribal immunity from constitutional protections has meant that tribal
members and others have been denied recourse for alleged violations of their
civil rights by tribal governments and courts.26 This denial of constitutional
guarantees came under close scrutiny in the early 1960s as the civil rights
movement gained momentum in the United States.7 The result was the
Indian Civil Rights Act,28 enacted by Congress in 1968 to place tribal
governments and courts under limitations similar to those placed on the
federal and state governments by the Amendments to the Constitution.
' 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 960 (1958). See discussion in V.
Deloria, Jr., and C. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian
Sovereignty (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) at 204-05 [hereinafter Nations Within].
Compare Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 374 P.2d 691 (S.C. Colo., En
Banc, 1962).
24 219 F.Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963).
2 Ibid. at 21. See also Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967) at 533. It seems, however, that habeas
corpus would lie against a detainment order issued by a tribal court in violation of the
Constitution if that court was established under an Act of Congress and was in effect
acting as a federal agency: See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965), and
Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903
(1970). Also, the prohibition against slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment, which limits
private as well as federal and state actions, has been held to invalidate a tribal custom
permitting slavery. See In re Sah Quah, 31 F.327 (D. Alaska 1886), and Cohen's
Handbook, supra note 14 at 665, 671-72 (note, however, that In re Sah Quah was decided
before Talton v. Mayes, supra note 17).
26 For a survey of instances of this, see B.D. Fretz, "The Bill of Rights and American Indian
Tribal Governments" (1966) 6 Nat. Res. J. 581 at 591-600. This immunity from the Bill of
Rights is part of the broader sovereign immunity which the tribes enjoy: see Turner v.
United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919) ; United States v. United States Fidelity Co., 309 U.S.
506 (1940) at 512. See also A. Lazarus, Jr., "Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act : An
Indian Bill of Rights" (1969) 45 N.D.L Rev. 337 at 340-44; Note, "The Indian Bill of
Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments" (1969) 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1343
at 1346-53 [hereinafter "Indian Bill of Rights"].
E.g., legal commentators used instances of violations of civil rights by tribal governments
to support their argument that the Bill of Rights should be applied to those governments:
see "Constitutional Rights", supra note 20; Note, "The American Indian - Tribal
Sovereignty and Civil Rights" (1966) 51 Iowa L. Rev. 654 ; R.L. Barsh & J.Y. Henderson,
The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2S 1980) at 254. See also the reports cited in note 33, infra.
Pub. L. 90-284, Titles II-VII : see infra notes 45-47.
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The Indian Civil Rights Act
Legislative History
The Indian Civil Rights Act resulted from investigations undertaken by the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, chaired by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina. Preliminary
inquiries by Ervin's subcommittee revealed numerous allegations of
violations of the civil rights of Indians by tribal authorities as well as by
federal, state and local officials.2 9 But while there are constitutional
protections against such violations by non-tribal officials,3 ° we have seen
that tribal authorities are not subject to those constitutional guarantees.31
Senator Ervin accordingly decided to investigate the matter.3 Citing his own
subcommittee's preliminary study and two other recent reports on Indian
affairs as justifications,33 he announced to Congress on August 25, 1961, that
his subcommittee was going to conduct hearings on "the constitutional
protections afforded reservation Indians as compared to those of other
American citizens. 34
The hearings conducted by Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights continued until 1965.3' Testimony revealed that, of
435 tribes, 247 had organized constitutions; of these, 117 had constitutional
provisions protecting individual civil rights.3 6 In tribal courts, Anglo-
American due process protections - such as rights to legal counsel, to remain
silent, to trial by jury, and to appeal - were often lacking.37 While cultural
differences provided a partial explanation why tribal governments and courts
operated in accordance with norms different from those of the rest of
29 D.L. Burnett, Jr., "An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act" (1972) 9
Harv. J. on Leg'n 557 at 575.
30 Whether Indians generally were in a position to make use of these protections is another
matter. During the hearings which Ervin's subcommittee ended up holding, testimony
revealed that most complaints involved violations of civil rights in "the enforcement of
state criminal laws by local authorities in communities relatively near Indian
reservations," ibid. at 584 [footnote omitted]. See also Nations Within, supra note 23 at
207-8. Obviously the constitutional protections were not very effective in practice.
3 In addition to cases and articles cited supra in notes 16-25, see a speech by Senator Ervin
entitled "The Rights of Indians Under the Constitution of the United States", delivered to
the Indian Law Committee, Federal Bar Association Annual Convention, 26 Sept. 1963,
and printed in 109 Cong. Rec. S19360-62 (11 Oct. 1963) [hereinafter "Rights of Indians"].
32 On Ervin's motives for undertaking this task, see Burnett, supra note 29 at 574-76.
33 W.A. Brophy & S.D. Aberle, eds., Report of the Commission on the Rights, Liberties and
Responsibilities of the American Indian (Fund for the Republic, 1961) (this was an
abbreviated preliminary report; for the final report, see W.A. Brophy & S.D. Aberle, eds.,
The Indian : America's Unfinished Business : Report of the Commission on the Rights,
Liberties and Responsibilities of the American Indian (Norman : University of Oklahoma
Press, 1966). As Burnett, supra note 29, states at 576, each report "had advanced the
conventional thesis that deviations from constitutional government in the United States
were improper in themselves and required eventual correction."
4 107 Cong. Rec. S17121 (25 Aug. 1961).
35 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Constitutional Rights of the
American Indian (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965).
36 Burnett, supra note 29 at 579.
3 Burnett, supra note 29 at 579-81. See also "Indian Bill of Rights", supra note 26 at 1356-
58.
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American society, practical considerations were also important, at least for
tribal courts. In particular, given their limited resources many tribal justice
systems could not afford legally-trained personnel, jury trials, or appeal
judges.38 The general counsel for the Warm Springs Confederation, one of
the larger, more affluent tribes, testified that, without financial assistance,
"imposition upon the tribal courts of all the requirements of due process as
we non-Indians know them, would mean the end of our tribal courts. 3 9
Tribal councils, however, were accused by some witnesses of violations of
fundamental rights, such as freedom of religion, that did not stem from
financial constraints. n° But testimony also revealed that some of the
problems resulted from failure by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to
respect due process requirements on reservations. According to Donald
Burnett, Jr.,
[t]he thrust of the testimony was that the BIA was less interested in
the adequacy of law enforcement on the reservations and in the
constitutional rights of the people for whom it was responsible than
in maintaining control over tribal courts and councils and over the
affairs of individuals. The attitude was neatly expressed, said the
Shoshone-Bannock attorney, in a remark attributed to a BIA
employee at Fort Hall : "We didn't have any trouble with the Indians
until they found out they had constitutional rights.
'Al
In proposing legislation to Congress to remedy the problems which the
hearings had revealed, Senator Ervin nonetheless decided to concentrate on
violations of civil rights by tribal authorities. 42 He acknowledged that these
violations occur, "not from malice or ill will, or from a desire to do injustice,
but from the tribal judges' inexperience, lack of training, and unfamiliarity
with the traditions and forms of the American legal system., 43 He offered the
following rationale for a legislative solution : "It is, of course, preferable that
the tribes themselves assure basic rights to each member, but when this is
not the case it is incumbent upon Congress to take action." 44 Several bills
were introduced by Senator Ervin in Congress, culminating in passage on
April 11, 1968, of the Indian Civil Rights Act.45 For reasons not relevant to
38 B urnett, supra note 29 at 581.
39 Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Congress, 1st Sess.,
pt. 4 at 872 (1963), as cited in Burnett, supra note 29 at 581. On the same page, Burnett
pointed out that "[alverage family incomes of $1,500, land held in trust by the BIA, and
meagre royalties received for white development of reservation resources provided
0 inadequate bases for tribal revenue" [footnotes omitted].
40 Burnett, supra note 29 at 581-82; "Indian Bill of Rights", supra note 26 at 1358-59.Burnett, supra note 29 at 583 [footnote omitted].
42 Ibid. at 588-89.
43 113 Cong. Rec. S 13473 (23 May 1967) (statement of Senator Ervin) [emphasis added].
4 "Rights of Indians", supra note 31.
4' Pub. L. 90-284, Titles H-VII, 82 Stat. 77-80, codified as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341
(1995). On modifications that were made to Ervin's earlier bills, see Burnett, supra note
29 at 589-604; Lazarus, supra note 26 at 337-38, 345-48.
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the present discussion,46 this legislation was included as Titles II to VII of
another statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1968.47
Provisions and Expressed Concerns
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) replicates most of the American Bill of
Rights and the equal protection and due process aspects of the Fourteenth
Amendment, with certain exceptions to be discussed below. 4 The relevant
provisions are in §§ 1302-1303,49 which need to be reproduced in full:
§ 1302. Constitutional Rights
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall:
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion,
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of
grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures,
nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just
compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy
and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
46 On the tactics of enactment, see Burnett, supra note 29 at 604-14.47 Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77.
48 The relevant provisions are contained in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Titles In
to VII deal with other Indian matters that are beyond the scope of this article, including the
drafting of a model code for Courts of Indian Offenses, limitations on state jurisdiction
over Indian reservations, the addition of assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the
major crimes committed by reservation Indians over which the federal courts have
jurisdiction, federal government approval of employment of legal counsel by Indians, and
revision and publication of certain works relating to Indian affairs, including Cohen's
Handbook (1st ed. 1942), supra note 14.
49 § 1301 is an interpretive section containing the following definitions:
(1) "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as possessing powers of self-government ;
(2) "powers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers possessed
by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals
by and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses ; and
(3) "Indian Court" means any Indian tribal court or court of Indian offense. In 1990 and
1991, § 1301(2) was amended to include "the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians" : Pub. L. 101-
511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 ; Pub. L. 102-37, 105 Stat. 646 (this was to reverse
the effect of Duro v. Reina, supra note 17, where it had been held that Indian tribes do not
have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians) : see Nell Jessup Newton,
"Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina" (1992) 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 109;
A.T. Skibine, "Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned It : A Power Play of
Constitutional Dimensions" (1993) 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 767.
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compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his
own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and
unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any
one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for
a term of one year and a fine of $5000, or both;
50
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law;51 or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by
imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less
than six persons.
§ 1303. Habeas Corpus
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe.
The part of the First Amendment prohibiting the establishment of religion
was deliberately omitted from § 1302 so that the theocratic governments of
some Indian tribes, particularly the Southwest Pueblos, would not be
threatened. 52 The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was left
out as well.53 The Fifth Amendment requirement of a grand jury for capital
and other infamous crimes was also omitted, no doubt because Congress had
used its plenary power in 1885 to assume jurisdiction over major crimes that
would otherwise have been within the jurisdiction of the tribes. Unlike the
50 The maximum penalties of six months imprisonment and fines of $500 in the original Act
were increased to the current amounts in 1986 by Pub. L. 99-570, Title IV, Subtitle C, Part
5, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (1986). No doubt these restrictions on sentencing were
thought to be justified because Congress, by what is commonly known as the Major
Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 362, § 9 (as amended), 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1995) [hereinafter Major
Crimes Act], had in 1885 taken jurisdiction over serious crimes away from the Indian
tribes: see R. Clinton, "Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands : A Journey Through a
Jurisdictional Maze" (1976) 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 at 536-45. Compare Task Force Two,
Tribal Government, Final Report to the American Indian Policy Review Commission
(Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976) at 34, recommending that "this
limitation on the penalty power of tribal courts be deleted from the Act, being totally
5 inconsistent with Federal policy supporting the concept of self-government."
S This provision comes from the original Constitution, art. I,§ 9, cl. 3, not from the
Amendments.52 See Statement of Congressman Ben Reifel Before the House Committee on Rules, on H.R.
2516, printed in 114 Cong. Rec. H9110-12 (4 Apr. 1968) at 9112; "Indian Bill of Rights",
53 supra note 26 at 1359.
See Lazarus, supra note 26 at 339, where it is suggested that this omission was perhaps
due to recollections of the Sioux and Apache military campaigns of the nineteenth century.
However, the omission would hardly be effective to keep the tribes from arming, as
Indians would still have the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to
the Constitution unless prohibited from doing so by their own tribal governments, to
which the Amendment does not apply.
54 By the Major Crimes Act, supra note 50, Congress severely restricted the impact of Ex
Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), where the Supreme Court had held that the Indian
tribes had jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against Indians in Indian
Country: See S.L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law,
and United States Law in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1994).
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Sixth Amendment, exercise of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings
was made to be at the expense of the accused so that the limited financial
resources of the tribes would not be strained." Finally, the right to a jury
trial was limited to offenses punishable by imprisonment.5 6 Rather than
simply applying the American Bill of Rights to the Indian tribes, Congress
thus made some attempt to acknowledge and take account of their unique
circumstances.57
Application of even this modified version of the Bill of Rights was
nonetheless opposed by some Indian tribes, especially the Pueblos in the
Southwest. A 1991 report of the United States Commission on Human
Rights, based on a five-year study of the enforcement of the ICRA,59
summarized some of their objections:
Among the general concerns raised were that the ICRA was an
infringement on tribal right to self-government, that implementation
of the ICRA's requirements would diminish or eliminate tribal
customs and traditions, that the ICRA was unnecessary in light of
similar guarantees and traditions in tribal law; and concern about
where the funding for these new guarantees was to come from in light
of the tribes' meager resources.6°
55 See The Indian Civil Rights Act, A Report of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, June 1991 [hereinafter Civil Rights Commission Report], 5. For further discussion,
see R.T. Coulter, "Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the
1968 Indian Bill of Rights" (1970-71) 3 Columbia Survey of Hum. Rts. L 49; V.C.
Milani, "The Right to Counsel in Native American Tribal Courts : Tribal Sovereignty and
56 Congressional Control" (1994) 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1279.
Some of the arguments against inclusion of a right to trial by jury, especially in civil
matters, included cost, the difficulty of finding impartial jurors in small communities, and
the inappropriateness of this form of trial in societies where kinship predominates : Civil
Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 9. During the Congressional hearings on the
legislation, Domingo Montoya, Chairman of the All Indian Pueblo Council of New
Mexico, said this : "it [was] no more logical to use a jury system for the settlement of
internal matters within the extended 'family' that makes up a pueblo than it would be to
use a similar system within the framework of an Anglo-American family as a means for
enforcing internal rules or resolving internal disputes" : Rights of Members of Indian
Tribes: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1968) [hereinafter Rights of
Members Hearings] at 37.
7 See J.R. Wunder, "Retained by the People ": A History of American Indians and the Bill of
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 135-40.
58 This Commission was established by Congress in 1957 as an independent, bi-partisan
agency to investigate allegations of discriminatory denial of the right to vote, collect
information and study legal developments in relation to discrimination and equal
protection, appraise federal laws and policies regarding discrimination and equal
protection, and submit reports and recommendations to Congress and the President :Civil
Rights Commission Report, supra note 55, inside front cover.
59 The sources of information for the Report are described thus : "At the core of the study
were hearings in five locations in which testimony was received from scores of individuals
including, among others, tribal judges, tribal council members, Indian law scholars, tribal
lay advocates, United States Attorneys, attorneys who practice before tribal courts,
representatives of tribal judges associations, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
Information was also gathered through field interviews, staff research, oral and written
correspondence, statements submitted by tribes, and responses to Commission requests for
information. In all, 162 persons provided testimony, and hundreds of others were
interviewed." Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 1-2 [footnotes omitted].
60 Ibid. at 8 [footnotes omitted]. The financial concerns appear to have been well founded:
see ibid. at 37-44, 71-72 (Findings 2, 4 and 5). Maria Odum, in an article in the New York
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Some more specific concerns were that elections based on the principle of
one person, one vote, were incompatible with the political structures of some
Indian tribes, that allowing actions to be brought in federal courts would
undermine the authority of tribal courts and weaken community unity, and
that the sentencing limits could interfere with tribal efforts to maintain
order.6'
Another example of how the Act could have a negative impact on tribal
traditions and customs was given by John S. Boyden on behalf of the Ute
and Hopi Tribes. In reference to the prohibition against compulsory self-
incrimination, he said this:
The defendants' standard of integrity in many Indian courts is much
higher than in the State and Federal Courts of the United States.
When requested to enter a plea to a charge the Indian defendant,
standing before respected tribal judicial leaders, with complete
candor usually discloses the facts. With mutual honesty and through
the dictates of experience, the Indian judge often takes a statement of
innocence at face value, discharging the defendant who has indeed,
according to tribal custom, been placed in jeopardy. The same Indian
defendants in off-reservation courts soon learn to play the game of
"white man's justice," guilty persons entering pleas of not guilty
merely to throw the burden of proof upon the prosecution. From their
viewpoint, it is not an elevating experience. We are indeed fearful
that the decisions of Federal and State Courts, in light of non-Indian
experience, interpreting "testifying against oneself' would stultify an
honorable Indian practice.
More generally, imposition of the due process requirements of an adversarial
system of justice could undermine tribal traditions.63 A number of years after
the enactment of the ICRA, Chief Justice Tom Tso of the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court wrote of the adjustments necessary for his Nation to conform
to Anglo-American standards of due process :
Times on 4 October 1991 entitled "Money Shortage Seen as Hindering Indian Justice",
wrote : "Indian judges charge that Congress left them with an impossible task when it
established standards for their legal system without providing money to help the courts
move toward something more like the adversarial system found in state and Federal
courts." Congress has recognized this problem. The Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. 103-
176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1995), authorized substantial
funding to support tribal courts by facilitating access to legal materials, improving court
records systems, assisting with continuing legal education, and providing technical
assistance:see F. Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers : American Indian Law and
Contemporary Tribal Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) 129-30.
Unfortunately, as of April, 1998, Congress had failed to make the appropriations necessary
to fulfill this promise : see R.J. McCarthy, "Civil Rights in Tribal Courts : The Indian Bill
of Rights at Thirty Years" (1998) 34 Idaho L. Rev. 465 at 513.
See S. O'Brien, "Federal Indian Policies and the International Protection of Human
Rights" in Deloria, supra note 20, 35 at 47; L. Medcalf, Law and Identity : Lawyers,
Native Americans, and Legal Practice (Beverley Hills : Sage Publications, 1978) at 91-93.
62 Rights of Members Hearings, supra note 56 at 127, as quoted in Civil Rights Commission
63 Report, supra note 55 at 8-9.
See Nations Within, supra note 23 at 213, suggesting that the rights-based approach of the
ICRA would replace the complex systems of responsibilities and duties that are
fundamental to traditional Indian societies.
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For the Navajo people, dispute settlement required the participation
of the community elders and all those who either knew the parties or
were familiar with the history of the problem. Everyone was
permitted to speak. Private discussions with an elder who could
resolve a problem was also acceptable. It was difficult for Navajos to
participate in a system where fairness required the judge to have no
prior knowledge of the case, and where who can speak and what they
can say are closely regulated.64
Concern was also expressed over the appropriateness of Congressional
imposition of civil rights guarantees on all the Indian tribes without their
consent. At the Senate Hearings prior to enactment of the ICRA, Arthur
Lazarus, Jr., General Council of the Association of American Indian Affairs,
said this :
Perhaps the major problem ... is the attempt in this legislation to
impose upon all Indian communities at one fell swoop a sophisticated
legal system that has been developing in our society over a period of
centuries. I suggest that Indian tribes vary - each having different
resources, customs, size, degree of education or assimilation, etc. -
and that the proposed establishment of one set of legal rules for all
tribes is unworkable and unwise. I further suggest that it is not
realistic to expect Indians (or any other nation) to learn respect for
our constitutional principles when their application is required by
legislative direction from outside and does not grow out of the actual
operations of tribal government.
65
The crux of the debate over the ICRA, both before and after its
enactment, has thus been tension between the application to Indian
governments of the Anglo-American approach to protection of individual
rights and freedoms on the one hand, and respect for Indian sovereignty and
tribal traditions on the other.66 While the legislative history and the
provisions of the Act itself reveal that Senator Ervin and Congress did
attempt to achieve some balance between these different values, the extent to
64 Chief Justice Tom Tso, "The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts" (1989) 31
Ariz. L. Rev. 225 at 229.
65 Hearings on S. 961-68 and S.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congress, 1st Sess. 1 (1965) at 65, as
quoted in G.K. Reiblich, "Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968" (1968) 10
Ariz. L. Rev. 617 at 620 n.11. See also Chaudhuri, supra note 20 at 30 : "Students of the
law are keenly aware that the nationalization of the Bill of Rights and its application to the
states has a complex history and one that is still in process. However, at least the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by the states. No such ratification was sought from
the tribes in the context of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The 'rights' were extended
unilaterally by Congress thereby again raising many questions of the role and meaning of
'consent' in democratic theory."
66 See R. Berry, "Civil Liberties Constraints on Tribal Sovereignty After the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968" (1993) 1 J.L. & Pol'y 1; J.S. Byram, "Civil Rights on Reservations:
The Indian Civil Rights Act and Tribal Sovereignty" (2000) 25 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 491;
J.T. Hardin, "Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal Sovereignty and the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968" (1979) 33 Ark. L. Rev. 399; F.P. Prucha, The Great Father: The
United States Government and the American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1984) at 1108-109.
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which they succeeded has been hotly debated.67 The ideological controversy
has since been fueled by judicial interpretation of the statute.
Judicial Interpretation : Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
It is both impossible and unnecessary for the purposes of this article to
provide anything like a comprehensive survey of the case law that the ICRA
has spawned over the 34 years since its enactment. This case law has been
produced by both federal and tribal courts. Prior to the 1978 decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,68 federal
courts were adjudicating generally on allegations of infringements of the
ICRA by tribal governments. 69 After that decision, actions in federal courts
have been limited to jurisdictional matters and habeas corpus.7" Since
Martinez, application of the substantive provisions of the ICRA has thus
been mainly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal courts.7
The Martinez case involved an application to the United States District
Court by Julia Martinez, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo in New
Mexico, and her daughter Audrey Martinez, on behalf of themselves and
similarly situated individuals, alleging that a 1939 Pueblo Ordinance
violated the equal protection provision in § 1302(8) of the ICRA. The
Ordinance granted membership in the Pueblo to children whose fathers were
members and mothers were non-members, but denied it to children whose
mothers were members and fathers were non-members. As Martinez had
married a Navajo man, the Ordinance excluded their children from
membership in the Pueblo. This exclusion meant that the children were
denied, among other things, the right to live in the community after their
mother's death, to inherit her land rights, to vote in Pueblo elections, and to
hold secular office in the Pueblo.72
67 E.g., see Burnett, supra note 29; J.R. Kerr, "Constitutional Rights, Tribal Justice, and the
American Indian" (1969) 18 J. Pub. L. 311 ; Lazarus, supra note 26 ; J. de Raismes, "The
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Pursuit of Responsible Tribal Self-Government"
(1975) 20 S.D.L. Rev. 59 ; Reiblich, supra note 65 ; Nations Within, supra note 23 at 200-
14 ; P. T. Shattuck and J. Norgren, Partial Justice: Federal Indian Law in a Liberal
Constitutional System (Providence : Berg Publishers, 1991) at 164-89 ; M. Smith, "Tribal
Sovereignty and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights" (1970) 3:3 Civil Rights Digest 9 ; Note,
"Indians - Criminal Procedure : Habeas Corpus as an Enforcement Procedure under the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303" (1971) 46 Wash. L. Rev. 541;
J.S. Warren, "An Analysis of the Indian Bill of Rights" (1972) 33 Montana L. Rev. 255;
A.J. Ziontz, "In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judicial Error in
Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act" (1975) 20 S.D.L. Rev. 1;.
436 U.S. 49 (1978) [hereinafter Martinez].
69 For references to the pre-Martinez federal court decisions, see Civil Rights Commission
Report, supra note 55 at 12-15; McCarthy, supra note 60 at 471-72. For critical
assessment of the earlier decisions, see Ziontz, supra note 67 at 20-58.
70 See McCarthy, supra note 60 at 473-78.
71 See Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 11-28. For a very useful survey of
reported tribal court decisions dealing with the ICRA, see McCarthy, supra note 60 at 489-
515.
72 Martinez, supra note 68 at 52-53. For a more detailed description of the benefits of Pueblo
membership, see the District Court's decision in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402
F.Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975) [hereinafter Martinez (D.N.M.)].
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The District Court dismissed a motion challenging the Court's
jurisdiction to decide the matter, but went on to find for the Pueblo on the
merits. 73 While acknowledging the vital importance of the applicants'
interests, Mechem D.J. held that the equal protection guarantee in the ICRA
... should not be construed in a manner which would require or
authorize this Court to determine which traditional values will
promote cultural survival and therefore should be preserved and
which of them are inimical to cultural survival and should therefore
be abrogated. Such a determination should be made by the people of
Santa Clara; not only because they can best decide what values are
important, but also because they must live with the decision every
day.
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's decision
that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the application of the ICRA to tribal
governments, but reversed on the merits.7" While agreeing that the equal
protection provision in the ICRA should not necessarily be interpreted and
applied in the same way as the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the Tenth Circuit decided that the Pueblo's interest in the
Ordinance, especially given its relatively recent enactment, was not
compelling enough to justify the sexual discrimination inherent in it.76
The Supreme Court reversed again, this time on the jurisdictional issue.77
Justice Thurgood Marshall, delivering the opinion of the Court, started his
analysis of this issue by reaffirming that the "Indian tribes are 'distinct,
independent, political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in
matters of local self-government."78 He then reiterated the position adopted
in Talton v. Mayes 9 that, "[a]s separate sovereigns pre-existing the
Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal
or state authority."8" Relying, however, on its plenary power, Congress had
enacted the ICRA, thereby "imposing certain restrictions upon tribal
governments similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment." ' The first question to be answered,
73 Martinez (D.N.M.), supra note 72.
74 Ibid. at 18. While the flexible approach to the construction and application of the
provisions of the ICRA taken by Mechem D.J. was consistent with a number of federal
court decisions, in other cases the requirements of the Act have been held to be identical to
equivalent provisions in the U.S. Bill of Rights : see Civil Rights Commission Report,
75 supra note 55 at 14-15. See also infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter Martinez
76 (10th Cir.).
The Tenth Circuit thought the Ordinance was motivated primarily by what it called
"practical economic considerations" (preservation of tribal property) : ibid. at 1048. See
also at 1040-41, 1047.
77 White J. dissented. Rehnquist J. concurred with the majority, except on the issue of the
78 sovereign immunity of the Indian tribes.
Martinez, supra note 68 at 55, quoting Worcester v. Georgia, supra note 12 at 559.
79 Supra note 16.
8o Martinez, supra note 68 at 56.
81 Ibid. at 57. See also at 63, esp. n.14, where Marshall J. specified some of the differences
between the ICRA and the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment.
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therefore, was whether Congress had intended to limit the tribes' sovereign
immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court's answer to this question was no. Any waiver of
sovereign immunity, Marshall J. said, "cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed." 2 As nothing in the ICRA purported to subject
tribes to the jurisdiction of federal courts in civil actions, 3 he concluded that
the tribes' sovereign immunity protected them from federal court actions for
violation of the Act.84 But as the sovereign immunity of the Santa Clara
Pueblo did not extend to its Governor, who had also been named as a
defendant in the action, Marshall J. also found it necessary to determine
whether the ICRA implicitly empowered federal courts to adjudicate on
allegations of violation of the Act by tribal officers.
The Court answered this second question in the negative as well.
Marshall J. expressed a number of concerns that influenced this part of the
Court's decision. He pointed out that the Supreme Court had shown
reluctance in the past to submit even matters of commercial and domestic
relations on Indian reservations to an outside forum, as that might infringe
the right of self-government and undermine tribal courts.8 1 "A fortiori," he
said, "resolution in a foreign forum of intratribal disputes of a more 'public'
character, such as the one in this case, cannot help but unsettle a tribal
government's ability to maintain authority." 6 He noted as well that the
provisions of the ICRA manifested "[t]wo distinct and competing purposes
... In addition to its objective of strengthening the position of individual
tribal members vis-4-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the
well-established federal 'policy of furthering Indian self-government.' '8 He
found evidence for the latter intention in the fact that the ICRA had
"selectively incorporated and in some instances modified the safeguards of
the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of
the tribal governments. 88 Moreover, he acknowledged that allowing actions
in federal courts to enforce the ICRA would "impose serious financial
82 Ibid. at 58, quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) at 4, cited in United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) at 399.
Regarding the habeas corpus jurisdiction provided by § 1303, he observed that the
respondent in such action would be the individual custodian of the prisoner, not the tribe:
84 Martinez, supra note 68 at 59.
For discussions of the impact of this aspect of the Court's decision, see Civil Rights
Commission Report, supra note 55 at 63-67 ; McCarthy, supra note 60 at 478-83.
8 Martinez, supra note 68 at 59. Marshall J. relied on Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)
(a state court does not have jurisdiction over a debt arising on a reservation between a
reservation Indian and a non-Indian merchant), and Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382
(1976) (a state court does not have jurisdiction over adoption where the parties are all
tribal members and residents on the reservation).
87 Martinez, supra note 68 at 60.
87 Ibid., quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) at 551.
88 Martinez, supra note 68 at 62-63. For the most important omissions and modifications, see
supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. Marshall J. referred as well to other provisions
of the ICRA (not discussed in this article) that were clearly intended to strengthen self-
government, such as §§ 1321-1323, by which Congress repealed and replaced § 7 of Pub.
L. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), making tribal consent necessary for state assumption of
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations : see Kennerly v. District Court,
400 U.S. 423 (1971).
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burdens on already 'financially disadvantaged' tribes." 9 Finally, Marshall J.
found that, apart from habeas corpus for which express provision had been
made by § 1303, there was no need for federal court jurisdiction, as tribal
courts provided an appropriate forum for bringing complaints of violations
of the ICRA. 90 The legislative history behind the Act revealed that, after
consideration of various options for federal court review of tribal criminal
proceedings, a conscious decision had been made to limit judicial review to
habeas corpus, as that "would adequately protect the individual interests at
stake while avoiding unnecessary intrusions on tribal governments." 9' Other
proposals for federal review of tribal actions involving civil matters were
also rejected. Marshall J. accordingly concluded:
These factors, together with Congress' rejection of proposals that
clearly would have authorized causes of action other than habeas
corpus, persuade us that Congress, aware of the intrusive effect of
federal judicial review upon tribal self-government, intended to create
only a limited mechanism for such review, namely, that provided for
expressly in § 1303 ...
By not exposing tribal officials to the full array of federal
remedies available to redress actions of federal and state officials,
Congress may also have considered that resolution of statutory issues
under § 1302, and particularly those issues likely to arise in a civil
context, will frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and
custom which tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate
than federal courts ... As suggested by the District Court's opinion in
this case, ... efforts by the federal judiciary to apply the statutory
prohibitions of § 1302 in a civil context may substantially interfere
with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically
distinct entity.
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As the jurisdictional issue decided in Martinez has not been re-visited by
the Supreme Court, the decision is still the leading case on the ICRA.
Attempts have been made in Congress to reverse the impact of the decision
by amending the ICRA to restrict the sovereign immunity of the Indian tribes
and to give the federal courts broader jurisdiction to enforce the Act, but
these initiatives have failed. 93 Nonetheless, almost twenty-five years after it
89 Martinez, supra note 68 at 64, quoting the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate
Judiciary Committee, Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Summary Report of
9o Hearings and Investigations Pursuant to S. Res. 194, 89th Congress, 2d Sess. (1966) at 12.
Martinez, supra note 68 at 65.
91 Ibid. at 67.
9' Ibid. at 70-72.
93 See amendments proposed by Senator Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah), 134 Cong. Rec. S 11652-56
(11 Aug. 1988). These amendments were supported by the U.S. Department of Justice: see
letter addressed to Senator Orrin Hatch, dated 22 Aug. 1988, from Thomas M. Boyd,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Washington, D.C. (copy
on file with author). Similar amendments were proposed by Senator Slade Gorton (R.-
Wash.) in the 1990s : e.g. see American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. §
2 (1998), printed in 144 Cong. Rec. S 1155-56 (27 Feb. 1998). See McCarthy, supra note
60 at 466, 488-89; N.J. Newton, "Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty
Indian Tribal Courts" (1998) 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 285 at 285-89.
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was delivered, the Martinez decision still generates controversy in both
political and legal circles.
Critical Assessment
The Martinez case exemplifies the efforts the courts of the United States
have made to interpret the ICRA so as to strike a balance between the
protection of individual civil rights and maintenance of Indian sovereignty
and traditions. The District Court and the Tenth Circuit both assumed
jurisdiction, but tried to apply the Act in a way that would be sensitive to the
traditions of the Santa Clara Pueblo.94 As we have seen, they came to
different conclusions on the merits, indicating how difficult it can be for
judges who are outsiders to adjudicate on matters that involve assessments
of the culture of an Indian nation.95 The Supreme Court avoided making
such an assessment by denying jurisdiction to the federal courts, except
where a writ of habeas corpus is sought.' This meant that the only forum
available to Julia and Audrey Martinez for a remedy for their complaint was
within the Santa Clara Pueblo.97 Given that the judicial authority of the
Pueblo was vested in the Tribal Council,98 their chances of obtaining a
remedy were therefore nil.99
The fact that the decision effectively left Julia and Audrey Martinez
without a remedy for the gender discrimination they experienced has
troubled many commentators. 0 Professor Catherine MacKinnon found
For a brief summary of other case law adopting such an approach, see J.D. Lynch, "Indian
Sovereignty and Judicial Interpretations of the Indian Civil Rights Act" [1979] Wash.
U.L.Q. 897 at 913-15. See also supra note 74. Compare infra notes 153-57 and
95 accompanying text.
E.g., the District Court and the Ninth Circuit disagreed over the extent to which the
Ordinance was based on tradition or motivated by more recent, practical considerations:
see Martinez (D.N.M.), supra note 72 at 16-18 ; Martinez (10th Cir.), supra note 75 at
1040-41, 1047-48. This kind of inquiry inevitably involves determinations (or, more
commonly, assumptions) about the meaning of tradition, which raises the problematic
issue of whether it can be created on an on-going basis. See J. Resnik, "Dependent
Sovereigns : Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts" (1989) 56 U. Chicago L. Rev.
671 at 709-11 ; R. Laurence, "A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo" (1991-92) 28 Idaho L. Rev. 307 at 334.
9 On the use of habeas corpus in federal courts, see Note, "Indians - Criminal Procedure:
Habeas Corpus as an Enforcement Mechanism under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303" (1971) 46 Wash. L. Rev. 541; McCarthy, supra note 60 at 473-
78.97 In a footnote to their judgment, the Supreme Court in Martinez, supra note 68 at 66 n.22,
suggested that, where tribal constitutions require Department of the Interior approval for
tribal ordinances, "persons aggrieved by tribal laws may, in addition to pursuing tribal
remedies, be able to seek relief from the Department". The effectiveness of this remedy
was questioned in Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 20-28, 71 (Finding
3(b)). Moreover, as the Supreme Court pointed out in the same footnote, the Santa Clara
98 Constitution did not contain such a requirement.
9 Martinez, supra note 68 at 66 n. 22.
Julia Martinez had in fact made concerted efforts to have the Pueblo Council change the
Ordinance and accept Audrey as a member, without success: Martinez (D.N.M.), supra
note 72 at 11, where Mechem D.J. concluded : "Plaintiffs have exhausted all available
remedies within the Pueblo."
10o In addition to the works referred to in the text of this article, see Byram, supra note 66;
R.C. Jeffrey, Jr., "The Indian Civil Rights Act and the Martinez Decision : A
Reconsideration" (1990) 35 S.D.L. Rev. 355; Resnik, supra note 95 ; G. Schultz, "The
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Martinez to be "a difficult case on a lot of levels.' '. 1 She acknowledged that
it "poses difficult tensions, even conflicts, between equality of the sexes, on
the one hand, and the need to approach those questions within their
particular cultural meanings, in an awareness of history and out of respect
for cultural diversity and the need for cultural survival, on the other."'0 2 By
"word of mouth," she had learned that the Santa Clara Ordinance was a
response to threats to Pueblo land caused by the 1887 General Allotment
Act, 10 3 rather than an outgrowth of tribal tradition."° MacKinnon accordingly
concluded that the Ordinance was a "male supremacist solution to a problem
male supremacy created."'0 5 She suggested that "cultural survival is as
contingent upon equality between women and men as it is upon equality
among peoples,"'0 6 but did not propose any means for achieving gender
equality within Indian tribes without federal court enforcement of the
ICRA's equal protection provision.0 7
Carla Christofferson expressed pessimism about the willingness of
Indian tribes to implement gender equality on their own.'08 She thought that
past assimilationist policies of the United States Government had destroyed
traditional equality in Indian cultures, so that Indian women became
disadvantaged :
Now the United States has stepped back from the discriminatory
culture it helped to create, leaving Indian women to fend for
themselves. Although the ICRA is designed to protect individual
rights from encroachment by the tribe, Native American women are
powerless to enforce such rights after the Santa Clara [Martinez]
decision.' 09
Federal Due Process and Equal Protection Rights of Non-Indian Civil Litigants in Tribal
Courts After Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez" (1985) 62 Denver U.L. Rev. 761.101 "Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo" in Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1987) 63 at 66.
'0' Ibid. at 65-66.103 24 Stat. 388, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1995).
'04 Supra note 101 at 66-67. Professor MacKinnon did not refer to the Tenth Circuit's
reported decision, where the origins of the Ordinance were discussed and the conclusion
was reached that it was motivated by an increase in mixed marriages and fears that this
would result in "enlarged demands for allocation of land and other tribal resources":
Martinez (10th Cir.), supra note 75 at 1040. For a serious attempt to place the Ordinance
in its cultural context, see Resnik, supra note 95 at 702-27.105 MacKinnon, supra note 101 at 67.
106 Ibid. at 68.
107 For critical commentary on Professor MacKinnon's essay, see Angela P. Harris, "Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory" (1990) 42 Stan. L Rev. 581 at 593-95
(suggesting that, despite her tentativeness, MacKinnon ultimately expected Julia Martinez
"to choose her gender over her race", thereby distorting her experience). See also Robert
A. Williams, Jr., "Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the Legacy of White
Patriarchy in an American Indian Cultural Context" (1990) 24 Ga. L Rev. 1019 at 1023
n.9.
log C. Christofferson, "Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect Native American Women: A
Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act" (1991) 101 Yale LJ. 169.
'09 Ibid. at 178-79.
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Obviously, Christofferson did not regard enforcement of the ICRA by tribal
courts as a means of protecting the rights of Indian women. "' She proposed
amendments to the ICRA that would expressly disallow discrimination
against women by Indian tribes and provide federal courts with jurisdiction
to enforce this provision after tribal remedies had been exhausted. For her,
this amendment would strike an appropriate balance between gender
equality and tribal sovereignty."'
Other commentators, especially Native Americans, have regarded the
ICRA, even as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Martinez, as an assault
on Indian values and traditions." 2 Rennard Strickland, while he was the
Langston Hughes Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of
Kansas, related the ICRA to the well-intentioned attempts by nineteenth
century reformers to assimilate the Indians by imposing Euro-American
values upon them:
The almost inevitable response is "how tragic" and "how absurd" that
white society should seek to impose such values on Indian people.
We think, "What fools were these nineteenth century men who did
not see that cultural values differ from group to group." How quaintly
dated, how Victorian, we muse. And yet, when we look at the present
day era we find, for example, much of this same attitude emerging in
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.3
Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle were more specific:
The real impact of the Indian Civil Rights Act ... was to require one
aspect of tribal government - the tribal court - to become a formal
institution more completely resembling the federal judiciary than the
tribal government itself resembled either the state or federal
governments. The informality of Indian life that had been the
repository of cultural traditions and customs was suddenly abolished,
and in its place came the rigid requirements that were necessary to
identify those instances in which the actions of the tribal government
impinged upon the rights of tribal members. 114
110 Despite the title of her article, however, Christofferson offered virtually no evidence that
tribal courts were not protecting the equality rights of female tribal members, as the equal
protection provision in the ICRA requires them to do. She seems to have assumed that,
because Julia and Audrey Martinez could not obtain a remedy within the Santa Clara
Pueblo, other Indian women would be similarly disadvantaged. However, examination of
the reported decisions of tribal courts concerning the ICRA has revealed that they are
doing a reasonably good job enforcing its provisions :see infra notes 142-52 and
accompanying text.
Christofferson, supra note 108 at 179-85. She expressly rejected proposals by Senator
Orrin Hatch (see supra note 93) for broad federal court enforcement of the ICRA after
exhaustion of tribal remedies : ibid. at 179-81. See also R.A. Williams, Jr., "Documents of
Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the
Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law" (1989) 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 237 at 271-75.
See M.S. Ball, "Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes" [1987] Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 1 at
123-25.
R. Strickland, "Genocide-at-Law :An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native
American Experience", The Langston Hughes Lectures, (1985-86) 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 713
at 737 [footnote omitted].114 Nations Within, supra note 23 at 213. See also commentary in note 63, supra.
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If the Indian nations did not submit to the constitutional norms and
procedural standards of American society, they risked losing even more of
the limited sovereignty that they had been able to retain.
Professor Robert Laurence, a self-described "tribal advocate,"' 5 thought
that the Martinez decision itself was responsible for an erosion of tribal
sovereignty. The "great irony" of the decision, he wrote, is that it "honored
tribal sovereignty so much that it threatens to destroy it.""16 Laurence saw a
connection between Martinez and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,"7
decided in the period between the argument and decision in Martinez. In
Oliphant, the Supreme Court held that tribal courts do not have inherent
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians."' This was the first of a series of
decisions in which the Supreme Court has systematically narrowed the
jurisdiction of Indian tribes over non-members, first in criminal".9 and then in
civil matters. 2° Laurence's point was that, by limiting federal court jurisdiction
over violations of the ICRA to writs of habeas corpus, Martinez virtually
assured that the Supreme Court would reduce the jurisdiction of the Indian
tribes so that the civil rights of non-members would be protected.' As a result,
the Court has been converting the territorial sovereignty of the Indian tribes
into personal jurisdiction over their members. If this process continues,
Laurence feared that the governmental status of Indian tribes could be reduced
to something like the status of private clubs. To avoid this, he suggested that
Congress reverse both the Martinez and the Oliphant decisions.'22
Unfortunately, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Hicks'23
reveals that the connection Professor Laurence saw between limited federal
court enforcement of the ICRA and Supreme Court reduction of tribal
115 Laurence, supra note 95 at 315.
116 Ibid. at 337.
"' 435 U.S. 191 (1978) [hereinafter Oliphant].
118 Marshall J., who authored the Martinez decision, wrote a dissenting opinion in Oliphant
that was joined in by Burger C.J.
nOliphant was followed in 1987 by Duro v. Reina, supra note 17, where the Supreme Court
decided that Indians who are not members of a tribe are not subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of that tribe's court. This was changed by legislation giving tribal courts
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians : see supra note 49.
120 E.g., see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) ; Nevada v. Hicks, supra note 17;
Strate v. A-] Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). For critical commentary, see P.P. Frickey,
"A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal
Authority Over Nonmembers" (1999) 109 Yale L.J. 1; S. Krakoff, "Undoing Indian Law
One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty" (2001) 50 Am. U.L.
Rev. 1177; F. Pommersheim, "Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the
12 Edge of the Prairie" (1999) 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 439.
Laurence, supra note 95 at 337-39. See also R. Laurence, "Martinez, Oliphant and Federal
Court Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act" (1988) 10 Campbell
L. Rev. 411. implicit in this argument, of course, is an assumption that tribal courts are
inadequate protectors of non-members' rights. Though the evidence so far is meagre, it is
not at all clear that this is the case : see M.D. Rosen, "Multiple Authoritative Interpreters
of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act"
(2000) 69 Fordham L. Rev. 479 at 572-77 (examining the ten reported cases where non-
members relied on the ICRA in tribal courts and concluding that, with a couple of possible
exceptions, the non-members were not unfairly treated). See also infra notes 146-49 and
122 accompanying text.
123 Laurence, supra note 95 at 339.Supra note 17.
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jurisdiction is well founded. In Hicks, the Court decided that a tribal court
did not have jurisdiction over a tort claim brought by a tribal member against
state officials in their individual capacities in relation to execution of a
search warrant on reservation lands. In a concurring judgment, Souter J.,
joined by Kennedy and Thomas JJ., said that non-members need "to know
where tribal jurisdiction begins and ends," in part because tribal courts
... differ from traditional American courts in a number of significant
respects. To start with the most obvious one, it has been understood
for more than a century that the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes. See
Talton v. Mayes ... Although the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(ICRA) makes a handful of analogous safeguards enforceable in
tribal courts, ... "the guarantees are not identical," Oliphant, at 194 ...,
and there is a "definite trend by tribal courts" toward the view that
they "ha[ve] leeway in interpreting" the ICRA's due process and
equal protection clauses and "need not follow the U.S. Supreme
Court precedents 'jot-for-jot."' In any event, a presumption against
tribal-court civil jurisdiction squares with one of the principal policy
considerations underlying Oliphant, namely, an overriding concern
that citizens who are not tribal members be "protected ... from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty," [Oliphant] at
210.124
Souter J. went on to observe that tribal courts differ as well in their
structures, the laws they apply, and "the independence of their judges. 125
Moreover, even when tribal court decisions involve non-tribal law they
cannot be appealed to state or federal courts. Justice Souter concluded : "The
result, of course, is a risk of substantial disuniformity in the interpretation of
state and federal law, a risk underscored by the fact that "[tiribal courts are
often 'subordinate to the political branches of tribal governments.',,'26
Souter J.'s message is clear: tribal courts cannot be trusted to protect the civil
rights of non-members.
12 7
As a major criticism of the Martinez decision has been that the remedies
available for enforcement of the ICRA within Indian tribes are inadequate, it
is important to assess whether this is actually true. At the time of the
decision in 1978, it appears that many tribes did not have their own courts
where remedies could be sought, though this problem has been alleviated by
rapid expansion of tribal court systems since Martinez.'28 Where tribal courts
are in place, complaints have been made that they lack the judicial
124 Ibid. at 2323.
12 Ibid.
126 Ibid. [emphasis added], citing a passage from Duro v. Reina, supra note 17 at 693, which
quoted from Cohen's Handbook, supra note 14 at 334-35.
127 Compare Rosen, supra note 121 at 572-77.
.9 See McCarthy, supra note 60 at 486 [footnotes omitted]: "There were 119 tribal courts in
1978. Ten years later, the number had increased to about 150, handling an estimated
230,000 cases annually. The growth of tribal judiciaries in the most recent decade has
been astounding. Today, of the more than 500 federally recognized tribal governments,
virtually all have some system of civil dispute resolution and most have criminal court
systems."
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independence necessary to make impartial decisions when violations of the
ICRA by tribal governments are alleged. 29 In their 1991 Report on the ICRA,
the United States Commission on Civil Rights acknowledged this to be a
problem in some tribes; however, in their view the solution was not federal
court review, but increased funding for tribal courts, education of tribal
councillors on the role of the judiciary and the importance of judicial
independence, and intertribal appellate systems.130 They wrote:
The Commission believes that respect for tribal sovereignty requires
that prior to any further intrusion by the Federal Government into tribal
justice systems, such as by way of imposing Federal court review,
tribal forums be first given the opportunity to institute proper
mechanisms that would operate with adequate resources, training,
funding, and support from the Federal Government. Because of the
great diversity of customs, traditions, resources, and even size, among
tribes, the solutions they adopt will necessarily vary. 131
The sovereign immunity of the Indian tribes, which was upheld by the
Supreme Court's decision in Martinez that the ICRA did not implicitly take
that immunity away where a federal court action was brought for violation
of the Act, has also been regarded as problematic. While some tribes have
statutorily waived their sovereign immunity in some instances, others have
not. 132 Some tribal court judges have interpreted the Martinez decision as
permitting suit against tribal governments in tribal courts, but other tribal
court judges have disagreed. 33 The problem, of course, is that the ICRA is
little more than a statement of principle insofar as violations of civil rights
by tribal governments are concerned if they can hide behind their sovereign
immunity. On the other hand, financially-pressed tribes fear that exposure to
civil damage claims might threaten their viability. Recognizing the
seriousness of this problem, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
recommended that the Federal Government provide funds "for the
establishment of several pilot projects to assist tribal governments in an
exploration of the extent to which they might enact statutory waivers of
sovereign immunity to allow civil rights suits against the tribe, without
jeopardizing the tribal government's viability.' 34  Otherwise, the
129 Besides safeguarding civil rights, it appears that an independent judiciary is important
factor in economic development on Indian reservations : see S. Cornell and J.P. Kalt,
"Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The Development Challenge in Indian Country
Today" (1998) 22:3 Am. Indian Culture & Rsch. J. 187, at 197-98.
130 Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 44-51.
131 Ibid. at 51. See also American Indians, American Justice, supra note 14 at 135-37.
132 See Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 63.
133 See ibid. at 66-67 ; McCarthy, supra note 60 at 478-83. According to the Civil Rights
Commission Report, tribal judges who have found that the ICRA did abrogate sovereign
immunity in tribal court suits have often relied on this passage from Martinez, supra note
68 at 65 : "Tribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA, and § 1302
has the substantial and intended effect of changing the law which these forums are obliged
134 to apply."
Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 74. See also F. Pommersheim & T.
Pechota, "Tribal Immunity, Tribal Courts, and the Federal System: Emerging Contours
and Frontiers" (1986) 31 S.D.L. Rev. 553.
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Commission saw a risk that Congress or the Supreme Court would impose a
solution that would be detrimental to tribal sovereignty. 135 In response to this
problem, many tribes have in fact waived their sovereign immunity in civil
rights cases, at least to the extent of allowing injunctive or declaratory
relief. 136
Sovereign immunity apart, evidence has been accumulating that the tribal
courts are doing a reasonably good job enforcing the provisions of the ICRA.
In its 1991 Report, the United States Commission on Civil Rights found that,
while a lack of judicial independence has hampered application of the Act
by some tribal courts, inadequate federal funding of tribal court systems is a
more serious problem. The Commission observed that, in enacting the
statute, Congress "did not fully take into account the practical application of
many of the ICRA's provisions to a broad and diverse spectrum of tribal
governments, and that it required these procedural protections of tribal
governments without providing the means and resources for their
implementation."' 37 They concluded:
The failure of the United States Government to provide proper
funding for the operation of tribal judicial systems, particularly in
light of the imposed requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, has continued for more than 20 years. Funding for tribal
judicial systems may be further hampered in some instances by the
pressures of competing priorities within a tribe.
1 38
In their recommendations, the Commissioners strongly encouraged Congress
to live up to the trust obligations of the Federal Government by providing
more funding to strengthen tribal governments and courts. 39 Instead of
imposing further restrictions on tribal sovereignty by amending the ICRA to
provide for federal judicial review, the Commissioners were of the view that
''respect for tribal sovereignty requires that prior to considering such an
imposition, Congress should afford tribal forums the opportunity to operate
with adequate resources, training, funding, and guidance, something they
have lacked since the inception of the ICRA."' 4
More recent assessments of tribal court enforcement of the ICRA have
also concluded that the most serious problem with tribal court systems is
inadequate funding. Robert McCarthy surveyed the reported tribal court
decisions involving the ICRA in the thirty-year period up to 1998.141 He
observed:
Tribal court criticism seems to be based to a large extent on anecdotal
evidence, since there has been virtually no scholarship dealing with
135 Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 67, citing S. Laffery, "Sovereignty:
Tribal Sovereign Immunity and the Claims of NonIndians Under the Indian Civil Rights
Act" (1981) 9 Am. Indian L. Rev. 289 at 308.
See Newton, supra note 93 at 338-41.
.17 Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 71.138 Ibid. at 72.
139 Ibid.
"4 Ibid. at 74.141 McCarthy, supra note 60 at 489-513.
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actual construction of the ICRA by tribal courts. Yet an analysis of
published tribal court opinions suggests that despite serious financial
constraints, tribal courts have been no less protective of civil rights
than have federal courts. With unique cultural perspectives, tribal
courts appear to have looked to federal precedent as well as tribal
traditions to discern the essential fairness implied by the requirement
of due process. There is an inherent risk in relying on self-selected
case reports as a barometer of due process in tribal courts, and the
number of reported decisions is relatively few. Nonetheless, with
those caveats, tribal courts appear to be no less protective - and much
more accessible - than federal courts have been in protecting civil
rights on Indian reservations.
142
McCarthy noted that most tribal members are too poor to avail themselves of
the ICRA's right to counsel. For him, this is a much greater barrier to justice
than lack of access to federal courts, as bringing suit in federal court would
not be a realistic option for the average tribal member. He concluded:
Any proposal which truly values extension of civil rights to tribal
members must recognize the need for increased tribal court advocacy.
Judges do not generally raise ICRA claims on their own initiative.
As important as a trained and well-funded judiciary is to effective
implementation of the ICRA, real progress requires real guarantees of
equal access to the courts. Effective implementation of the ICRA
depends not so much on federal courts located far from poor
reservation communities, more so on well-trained and financed tribal
courts, but mostly on an Indian civil rights movement in which low
income Native Americans have equal access to justice in tribal courts,
in traditional peacemaking practices, and in the larger society.
14 1
Professor Nell Newton studied the 85 tribal court decisions published in
the Indian Law Reporter in 1996, of which 22 cases raised civil rights
issues.' 44 She found that the tribal court had agreed with the party making the
civil rights claim in 11 of those cases. Moreover, non-Indians had been
either plaintiffs or defendants in 18 of the 85 cases studied, and were
probably parties in 19 others. Newton observed that "these non-Indian
parties were treated fairly."' 145 One instance occurred in Simplot v. Ho-Chunk
Nation Department of Health," where the Ho-Chunk Tribal Court found
that the non-Indian plaintiffs had been denied the due process they were
entitled to under the ICRA when their employment was terminated by the
defendant, and ordered that they be reinstated and paid damages. 147 Newton
concluded:
142 Ibid. at 489-90. See also at 513 :"The evidence suggests that efforts to strip tribes of
sovereign immunity or to greatly expand federal review of tribal courts are overbroad
remedies for an exaggerated problem, unfairly based on anecdote and cultural prejudice."
Accord R.D. Probasco, "Indian Tribes, Civil Rights, and Federal Courts" (2001) 7 Tex.
Wesleyan L. Rev. 119 at 150-55.
McCarthy, supra note 60 at 414-15.
144 Newton, supra note 93 at 290, 341.
141 Ibid. at 352.
146 23 Indian L. Rep. 6235 (Ho-Chunk Tribal Ct. 1996).
'47 See Newton, supra note 93 at 345-46, 352.
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As demonstrated through this relatively small sample of tribal court
cases, the tribal courts, although forced to engraft Western legal
principles onto their consensual form of decision making, have been
highly successful in doing so. In part, this is because they are
sensitive to the potential loss of their independent adjudicatory
systems if they were to overstep the boundaries placed upon them by
the Congress and the courts, and in part because they have had to
become adept at melding the traditions and customs of their cultures
with those legal principles guiding the majority culture. Unlike their
critics, tribal courts do not dismiss well-reasoned opinions of the
majority culture's courts but choose, instead, to use these Western
principles with their own customary and traditional norms.148
Professor Newton thought that tribal court opinions need to be reported more
extensively and distributed more widely so they are more available to other
judges, legislators, scholars, and majority and minority communities. This
would "erve to eradicate misconceptions," she wrote, and might "allow for a
critical dialogue with these opinions without eradication of the courts
themselves."'
49
An even more extensive examination and analysis of case law involving
the ICRA was published in 2000 by Professor Mark Rosen. 5 ° Like Robert
McCarthy and Nell Newton, he found that the evidence did not reveal a need
for the expanded federal court jurisdiction or curtailed tribal court
jurisdiction proposed by some commentators and members of Congress. He
found as well that these proposals were based on concerns arising from
anecdote rather than detailed evaluation of the available empirical evidence:
Close examination of the tribal case law suggests that [these
concerns] are grossly overstated if not entirely misplaced. The study
suggests that ICRA's regime of multiple authoritative interpreters
[primarily the judges of various tribal courts] has worked well. Tribal
courts have found significant individual protections in ICRA even
though they express the values of due process, equal protection, and
so on, in ways that reflect and support tribal culture. This finding
casts doubt on the wisdom of curtailing the powers of the tribal
courts. 15'
Federal courts, on the other hand, have not always shown sensitivity to
Indian cultures and traditions when petitions for writs of habeas corpus have
been made under § 1303 of the ICRA. In Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of
Seneca Indians,'52 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed arguments
based on tribal tradition and decided that a writ of habeas corpus would lie
148 Ibid. at 352-53.
"49 Ibid. at 353.
150 Rosen, supra note 121.
151 Ibid. at 581-82. See also at 512-77, for extensive analysis of the case law.
152 85 F.3d 874 (2nd Cir. 1996).
98 Kent McNeil
against a banishment order by a tribal council.'53 Cabranes Cir. J. observed
that there was a tension
... in any case involving questions of rights and questions of culture:
whether the principles that guide our inquiry into the "criminal" or
"civil" nature of the tribal action in this case or the severity of the
restraint imposed must be "culturally defined" by the tribe, or
whether we can approach these questions guided by general
American legal norms or certain universal principles.
154
After a brief discussion of this essential question, he gave a categorical
response :
In sum, there is simply no room in our constitutional order for the
definition of basic rights on the basis of cultural affiliations, even
with respect to those communities whose distinctive "sovereignty"
our country has long recognized and sustained.
55
While not all federal judges have taken such a rigid approach, Professor
Rosen pointed out that there is still a tendency on the part of federal courts to
permit variation from federal doctrines
... only when the Indian practice being challenged "differ[s]
significantly from those 'commonly employed in Anglo-Saxon
society."' But when tribes adopt procedures akin to those found in
general society, these courts have held, the tribes are subject to the
ordinary federal requirements imposed by due process, equal
protection, and so forth.
156
The thorny question of what counts as "tradition" obviously figures
prominently in this kind of superficially balanced approach.
Our discussion of the commentary on the Martinez decision and the
assessments that have been made of tribal court enforcement of the ICRA
reveal the complexity of the issues and the range of opinions on how to
achieve an appropriate balance between civil rights and Indian sovereignty
and traditions. Fortunately, for the purposes of this article it is not necessary
to try to resolve the controversies that the ICRA and the Martinez decision
have provoked. Instead, my goal is to attempt to identify lessons that we in
Canada can learn from the American experience that will assist us in
determining whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should
apply to traditional Aboriginal governments. For while recognizing that the
historical and constitutional contexts are quite different in our two countries,
I nonetheless think that the fundamental issues are remarkably similar.
153 Among other things, the majority questioned whether the banishment really was in
accordance with tribal tradition: ibid. at 889, 900. On the problem of judges who are not
from the community determining what is traditional, see supra note 95.
'54 Ibid. at 900.
151 Ibid. at 900-01.
156 Rosen, supra note 121 at 580-81, quoting Randal v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1988), at 900, which relied on, among other cases, Howlett v. Salish and
Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976), at 238.
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Lessons for Canada
Our starting point must be the U.S. Supreme Court's consistent adhesion for
more than 100 years to the principle that the Indian nations are not subject to
the American Constitution when they are exercising their inherent powers of
self-government. Of course this principle is rooted in the recognition by
Chief Justice Marshall in the 1830s that the Indian nations retained limited
inherent sovereignty after European colonization and incorporation of their
territories into the United States. While there is no such history of judicial
acknowledgement of the inherent sovereignty of the Aboriginal nations in
Canada, I think there are sufficient indications that the Supreme Court of
Canada will move in the direction of the U.S. Supreme Court in this regard
when an appropriate case comes before it.'57 When that happens, it will
become necessary to interpret the Canadian Constitution in a way that
accommodates the right of the Aboriginal peoples to exist as distinct
political communities.'58 This interpretive approach will have to be applied
to the Charter as well as to the rest of the Constitution. I have argued in the
past that, as a matter of construction, the Charter does not apply of its own
force to Aboriginal governments that are exercising inherent powers. 59 In
my opinion, this conclusion can be supported by the long-standing American
principle that the Indian nations are not subject to the U.S. Bill of Rights. In
addition to the fact that, like the provisions of the American Bill of Rights,
s.32 of the Charter does not explicitly refer to Aboriginal governments,] 60
preservation of the distinctive cultures and traditions of the Aboriginal
nations is as much a constitutional principle in modern-day Canada as it is in
the United States.
1 61
157 See R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025; R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821; Mitchell v.
M.N.R., [2001] 3 C.N.L.R. 122 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J. For a trial court decision
acknowledging the inherent right of self-government, see Campbell v. British Columbia,
[2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.). For discussion, see Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Rights in
Canada : From Title to Land to Territorial Sovereignty" (1998) 5 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L
253 at 278-98, republished in Emerging Justice?, supra note 2, 58 at 82-101.
'58 See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation : Aboriginal
Peoples, Self-Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1993) ; K. McNeil, "Envisaging Constitutional Space for Aboriginal Governments" (1993)
19 Queen's LJ. 95, republished in Emerging Justice?, supra note 2, 184 ; Macklem, supra
note 8.
159 See McNeil, supra note 2. Compare the works cited supra note 8.
60 S.32(1) provides that "[t]his Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of
Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters
relating to the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories; and (b) to the legislature
and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the
legislature of each province." For conflicting opinions on whether Aboriginal governments
can be brought within the scope of this provision, compare RCAP Vol. 2, supra note 8 at
227-32 (arguing that they can), with McNeil, supra note 2 at 68-79 (Emerging Justice? at
220-31), and Wilkins, supra note 8 at 58-80 (arguing that they cannot). For a valuable
assessment of the arguments both ways, see Macklem, supra note 8 at 198-210. See also
161 Russell, supra note 9 at 184-86.
The Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, s.35(1), acknowledged this by providing
constitutional protection to the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal
peoples. In interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance
of preserving the distinctive practices, customs, and traditions of the Aboriginal peoples:
see R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
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In the 1960s, American policy-makers grappled with the fact that the Bill
of Rights does not apply to the Indian nations as a matter of constitutional
law. Before any decision was made by Congress to deal with the situation,
extensive hearings were conducted by Senator Sam Ervin's Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights, beginning in 1961. The legislation he proposed
was revised in important respects before its eventual enactment as the ICRA
in 1968, in part to take account of concerns expressed by some of the Indian
nations. 62 As we have seen, the provisions in § 1302 of the Act are modelled
on, but do not mirror, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
163
As the Supreme Court recognized in Martinez, the ICRA was designed to
strike a balance between the protection of civil rights and maintenance of
Indian traditions and tribal sovereignty.164
In contrast to this, the debate in Canada over whether the Charter should
apply to Aboriginal governments has generally proceeded as though the
answer is either yes or no.'65 Those who think the Charter should apply tend
to regard s.25, which provides that the guarantee of certain fights and
freedoms in the Charter "shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate
from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the
aboriginal peoples of Canada," as a means for ensuring that Aboriginal
cultures and traditions are protected. Peter Hogg and Mary Ellen Turpel,
after finding it "probable that a court would hold that Aboriginal
governments are bound by the Charter,"'166 thought it
... likely that some actions of Aboriginal governments would be
exempt from the Charter by virtue of section 25 and that the Charter
would be interpreted in a manner deferential to and consistent with
Aboriginal culture and traditions ... Interpretations of the Charter that
are consistent with Aboriginal cultures and traditions would likely be
found when the court is faced with a situation where different
162 See Burnett, supra note 29 at 588-603.
163 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
164 Martinez, supra note 68 at 62-64.
165 E.g., the failed Charlottetown Accord, officially titled the Consensus Report on the
Constitution (Ottawa: 1992), would have applied the Charter to Aboriginal governments
generally: for discussion, see M.E. Turpel, "The Charlottetown Discord and Aboriginal
Peoples' Struggle for Fundamental Political Change" in K. McRoberts & P. Monahan,
eds., The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1993) 117; K. McNeil, "The Decolonization of Canada:
Moving Toward Recognition of Aboriginal Governments" (1994) 7 West. Leg. Hist. 113
at 138-40, republished in Emerging Justice?, supra note 2, 161 at 180-82.
166 Hogg & Turpel, supra note 8 at 416. While they predicted that Canadian courts would
apply the Charter to Aboriginal governments, it is not clear whether they thought the
courts should do so (compare the other works by Turpel cited supra note 9). They
recommended that Aboriginal peoples include Charters of rights that reflect their
particular traditions and values in their own constitutions. While they did not think these
Aboriginal Charters would displace the Canadian Charter, they predicted that "they
would not be ignored by the courts, which would then be more likely (invoking section
25) to respect laws and decisions that had been made by an Aboriginal government within
the framework of its constitution": ibid. at 419-20.
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standards apply and the difference is integral to culturally-based
167policy within an Aboriginal community.
I do not share their optimism that Canadian courts would apply the Charter
to Aboriginal governments in culturally appropriate ways. 168 The American
experience reveals that, while some federal court judges in habeas corpus
cases have made sincere efforts to balance the protections accorded to civil
rights by the ICRA against tribal values and interests, others have shown
much less sensitivity. 69 As we have seen, the U.S. Supreme Court itself in
the Martinez decision concluded that "efforts by the federal judiciary to
apply the statutory prohibitions of § 1302 [of the ICRA] in a civil context
may substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a
culturally and politically distinct entity."'
' 70
I find it remarkable that proponents of the Charter's application to
Aboriginal governments in Canada appear prepared to go ahead without the
kind of serious investigation that was conducted in the United States to
assess the potential impact the Charter might have on Aboriginal cultures
and traditions. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, for example,
concluded that the Charter does apply to Aboriginal governments, and
depended on s.25 and Canadian courts to temper its application so that it
does not have a negative impact on Aboriginal cultures and traditions. 7 '
Dan Russell, an Aboriginal lawyer practicing in Toronto, is also critical of
the Commission's position. In his perceptive book, A People's Dream :
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, he wrote in reference to this aspect
of the Commission's Report:
One of the most serious concerns is the lack of substantive discussion
about the problems created when Aboriginal communities' collective
values conflict with the individualistic norms imposed by the Charter
... The commission indicated that it had heard various Aboriginal
leaders from across the country, many of whom had indicated a
concern about the implications of the Charter for their collective
rights. Seemingly, these concerns had little impact on the
commissioners.
There is no discussion in the report about how Aboriginal values
concerning clan mother elections are threatened by the democratic
rights reflected in Section 3 of the Charter. No mention is made of
the damage that threatens a community's values when an individual
is insulated from having to speak on his or her own behalf in court.
Neither is an Aboriginal community protected from imposition of the
167 Ibid. at 418. This view was endorsed by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples:
RCAP Vol. 2, supra note 8 at 232-33.
168 E.g., the "integral to the distinctive culture" test for Aboriginal rights created by the
Supreme Court in R. v. Van der Peet, supra note 161, reveals that, even at that level, some
judges have static, historical conceptions of Aboriginal cultures : see J. Borrows, "Frozen
Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster" (1997) 22 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 37; R.L. Barsh & J.Y. Henderson, "The Supreme Court's Van der Peet Trilogy:
Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993.
79 See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
170 Martinez, supra note 68 at 72 : see supra note 92 and accompanying text.1 RCAP Vol. 2, supra note 8 at 226-34.
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Charter's double-jeopardy clause, which would deny the community
the ability to deal in a culturally significant way with an offender.
Plainly, none of these issues appears to have been considered by the
commission. If they were, the report itself is entirely silent on these
matters. '72
Unlike the Commission, Russell engaged in a detailed analysis of the
possible effects of specific Charter provisions on Aboriginal communities.'
He concluded that the "Charter's impact on self-governing Aboriginal
communities could have profound implications for many traditional values
and customs."'7
Our examination of the American experience has revealed that, since the
Martinez decision in 1978, the main debate has been over whether the
federal courts should have general jurisdiction over ICRA violations by
Indian nations. In Canada, those who think the Charter does or should apply
to Aboriginal governments generally appear to assume that Charter
complaints against those governments could be brought in Canadian courts.
This is probably because there is not any Canadian equivalent to the system
of tribal courts that exists in the United States.'75 However, this means that
the main protection that the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the ICRA
provided to Indian traditions and tribal sovereignty - namely, exclusive
tribal court jurisdiction except where a writ of habeas corpus is sought -
would be missing in Canada if the Charter were to apply to Aboriginal
governments. Aboriginal nations would have to depend entirely on the
sensitivity of Canadian judges to safeguard their cultures against the
potentially negative effects of the Charter, a situation that the U.S. Supreme
Court, as we have seen, thought might "substantially interfere with a tribe's
ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity."'
' 76
A major concern in the United States in the aftermath of Martinez has
been that Indian women, especially in tribes that have not created an
independent judiciary or have not waived their sovereign immunity, may be
left with no remedy against gender discrimination by their tribal
governments. In my opinion, we are unlikely to encounter this problem in
172 Russell, supra note 9 at 183 [footnotes omitted].
17 Ibid., at 103-13.
174 Ibid. at 127. See also Wilkins, supra note 8 at 84-99, concluding at 99 that "it makes much
more sense to deal case by case with allegations of real abuse and injustice in the exercise
of inherent self-government rights than to begin by demanding compliance with a rights
regime [the Charter] that threatens the very traditions on which such rights are based"
[footnote omitted].
175 Modern treaties may, however, provide for the creation of Aboriginal courts: e.g., see the
Nisga'a Final Agreement, initialled 4 August 1998, ch. 12, paras. 30-49. Although ch. 2,
para. 9, of that Agreement provides that the Charter "applies to Nisga'a Government in
respect of all matters within its authority", the jurisdiction conferred on the Nisga'a Court
by ch. 12, paras. 38-41, does not explicitly include enforcement of the Charter. This may
mean that Charter challenges against the Nisga'a Government can only be brought in a
Canadian court. But even if the Nisga'a Court could entertain Charter challenges, it would
not have the last word (as tribal courts in the United States do, except where imprisonment
is involved) because decisions of the Nisga'a Court are generally appealable to the British
Columbia Supreme Court: ibid., ch. 12, paras. 45-48.176 Martinez, supra note 68 at 72.
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Canada, even if the Charter does not apply to Aboriginal governments.
177
Section 35(4) of the Constitution Act, 1982, specifies that "the aboriginal
and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male
and female persons." This provision, which was added by an amendment
agreed to by four national Aboriginal organizations in 1983,178 complements
s.28 of the Charter, which provides that, "[n]otwithstanding anything in this
Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to
male and female persons."'7 9 As I am of the view that self-government is an
Aboriginal right that is recognized and affirmed by s.35(1), I think the
exercise of that right is subject to the gender equality mandated by s.35(4). 180
While it can be argued that Aboriginal courts should have at least initial
jurisdiction to ensure that their own governments respect these provisions, 181
I think Canadian courts would assume jurisdiction, thereby avoiding the
problem of enforcement of gender equality that arose in the United States as
a result of Martinez.1
82
We have seen that the studies that have been done of tribal court
enforcement of the ICRA have emphasized the need for adequate federal
support and funding for tribal court systems. In Canada, where tribal courts
are generally non-existent, there is a pressing need for recognition and
support for Aboriginal justice systems.'83 The American experience reveals
that effective self-government involves not only the power to make and
administer Aboriginal laws, but also the authority to enforce those laws
within Aboriginal communities. No community can be truly self-governing
as long as disputes arising within the community have to be resolved,
especially at first instance, by judges who have no connection with the
177 For other views, see works cited supra note 9, esp. Native Women's Association of
Canada, Nahanee, and Mclvor.
178 Constitutional Amendment Proclamation, 1983, SI/84-102. The four organizations were
the Assembly of First Nations, the Inuit Committee on National Issues, the Mrtis National
Council, and the Native Council of Canada.
179 Section 28 probably encompasses the rights and freedoms of the Aboriginal peoples
mentioned in s. 25 see B. Slattery, "The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and
Treaty Rights" (1982) 8 Queen's L.J. 232 at 240-42; M.. Eberts, "Sex-based
Discrimination and the Charter" in A.F. Bayefsky & M. Eberts, eds., Equality Rights and
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 183 at 217-18;
Isaac and Maloughney, supra note 9 at 465-67.
'8 See McNeil, supra note 2 at 76-78 (Emerging Justice? at 227-29).181 Ibid. at 78-79 (Emerging Justice? at 229-30).
182 This approach would accomplish much the same thing as the amendments to the ICRA
proposed by Christofferson, supra note 108 : see notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
Recall, however, that she thought federal court jurisdiction over gender discrimination
should be subject to exhaustion of tribal remedies : see supra note 111 and accompanying
text. [You have to read the text accompanying note Il1 as well as the note itself to
understand the difference between her views and Hatch's - I have attempted to make this
clearer to the reader by italicizing genrally in note 111.]
183 Numerous studies have revealed how the Canadian justice system is failing Aboriginal
people: e.g., see Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution,
Commissioners' Report: Findings and Recommendations (Halifax: Royal Commission on
the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution, 1989) ; M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada:
A Report of the Committee of the Canadian Bar Association on Imprisonment and Release
(Ottawa : Candian Bar Association, 1988), republished in (1989) 23 U.B.C.L. Rev. 205;
Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991).
See also (1992) U.B.C.L. Rev. Special Edition : Aboriginal Justice.
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community and no experience with its culture and traditions. 84 The
application of the Charter to Aboriginal governments is therefore related to
a much larger issue, namely the extent to which Canadian courts should have
jurisdiction over legal disputes arising within Aboriginal communities. It
seems to me that attempting to resolve the issue of the application of the
Charter without addressing this larger issue would be a serious mistake,
especially if it is thought that the Charter issue can be answered with a
simple yes or no.
The American experience reveals that the application of civil rights
guarantees to Aboriginal governments is much more complicated than we in
Canada have generally thought, and demonstrates that we should be
considering a range of possible solutions rather than one simple answer. We
need to have a much clearer idea of what effect the Charter might have on
Aboriginal cultures and traditions. This necessitates a careful assessment of
the potential impact of each of the Charter's provisions in the context of the
unique cultures of the various Aboriginal nations. If application of the
Charter's provisions, either in their current form or modified to take account
of Aboriginal values and traditions, is determined to be appropriate, the issue
of whether Canadian courts should have jurisdiction to enforce those
provisions, either at first instance or by way of appeal, will need to be
addressed in the broader context of Aboriginal justice systems. And non-
Aboriginal governments have to be prepared to provide the resources, and
give Aboriginal justice systems a chance to work. All this should be done in
co-operation with the Aboriginal peoples, through agreements negotiated
with them. Imposition of Canadian values and norms on the Aboriginal
peoples perpetuates colonialism and - as our history teaches us so well -
simply does not work.
Rsum
Le d6bat entourant l'application de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertds aux
gouvemements autochtones se poursuit. Scion I'auteur, on n'a pas assez tenu compte
au Canada de I'exp~rience amdricaine de l'application des droits garantis ces
gouvernements. Cette exp6rience montre qu'au cours des quarante demires anndes
d~cideurs politiques et juges se sont affront~s A cette question et ont tent6 de trouver
un 6quilibre entre la protection des droits individuels et le respect de la souverainet6
et des traditions autochtones. A la lumire de l'exp6rience am6ricaine, il serait trop
simpliste de r6pondre par un simple oui ou non A la question de l'application de la
Charte aux gouvernements autochtones. I1 faudra notamment rtflchir A l'impact de
la Charte sur les cultures autochtones et au r6le des tribunaux canadiens dans
l'adjudication de disputes / l'int6rieur de communautds autochtones.
184 One view of the common law is that it is the expression of the values and norms of society
by judges who are very much a part of that society: See C.K. Allen, Law in the Making,
7th ed. (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1964) at 71-77.
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Abstract
The debate over the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to
Aboriginal governments remains unresolved. In the author's opinion, insufficient
attention has been paid in Canada to the American experience with the application of
civil rights guarantees to tribal governments. This experience reveals that for the past
forty years American policy-makers and judges have been struggling with this
contentious issue, and have attempted to achieve a balance between the protection of
individual rights and preservation of tribal sovereignty and traditions. In light of the
American experience, the author argues that a simplistic yes or no answer to the
Charter's application to Aboriginal governments is inappropriate. In particular, more
consideration has to be given to the impact of the Charter on Aboriginal cultures and
to the role of Canadian courts in adjudicating disputes that arise within Aboriginal
communities.
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